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Abstract: In October 2016, Public Health England was initially notified of four cases of cryptosporid-
iosis among users of two swimming pools. We investigated to identify further cases, the outbreak
source, and ensure the implementation of appropriate control measures. Probable primary cases
had diarrhoea and reported swimming in the pools 1–12 days prior to illness; confirmed cases were
verified by the reference laboratory. Secondary cases had contact with primary cases 1–12 days
prior to illness. We identified twenty-two cases: eleven were primary (eight confirmed) and eleven
were secondary (five confirmed). Four cases were infected with C. parvum (different gp60 subtypes);
all were primary and swam at two pools. Seven primary and secondary cases were infected with
C. hominis gp60 subtype IdA16, and all were associated one pool. Failings in pool water treatment and
management were identified that likely contributed to the load on the filters and their efficiency. Our
investigation identified a complex outbreak, with secondary transmission, involving exposures to
two swimming pools. C. hominis IdA16 is rare; it has been isolated from only three previous UK cases.
We hypothesize that C. hominis cases arose from a common exposure, and the C. parvum cases were
likely sporadic. This investigation highlights the value of integrating epidemiology and microbiology
to investigate clusters of Cryptosporidium cases, defining the extent of the outbreak and the likely
transmission pathways.
Keywords: Cryptosporidium; typing; outbreaks; swimming pools; gp60
1. Introduction
Cryptosporidium is a common protozoal cause of human acute gastroenteritis in the UK,
with Cryptosporidium hominis and Cryptosporidium parvum accounting for most laboratory-
confirmed cases [1]. Cryptosporidiosis is a self-limiting illness, but those with underlying
immunosuppression may experience complications. Predominant symptoms include
watery diarrhoea and abdominal cramps; although the incubation period is reported in
communicable disease handbooks to range from one to 12 days with an average of seven
days [2], the biology of the parasite [3] and human infectivity studies indicate onset of
symptoms is more likely after 3 days [4]. Diarrhoea can last for around two weeks and is
generally longer than other infectious causes of gastroenteritis. High numbers of oocysts
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may be shed in faeces, and very low numbers can cause disease [5]. Asymptomatic carriage
can occur [1].
In the UK, methods for testing stool samples for Cryptosporidium at local laboratories
vary according to those described in national guidelines [6], but all laboratory-confirmed
cases of cryptosporidiosis are routinely, statutorily notified to the public health agencies [7].
Subsequently, information is usually forwarded to local environmental health officials,
and confirmed cases are interviewed by Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) using a
standardised case questionnaire, which includes information on illness onset, symptoms,
and detailed exposure information for the two weeks prior to symptoms, including recre-
ational water use [8]. Infection control advice is also provided, including not to swim for
two weeks after symptoms cease [9]. Completed case questionnaires are usually sent to
the local Health Protection Team (HPT) and prospectively entered into local and national
systems in order to identify potential links between cases [8].
In England and Wales, the national Cryptosporidium Reference Unit (CRU), Public
Health Wales, Swansea, UK provides confirmatory specialist testing by polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) and immunofluorescence microscopy (IFM) where there is a clinically high
index of suspicion of illness, but tests are negative locally for Cryptosporidium. Species
identification and subtyping by PCR or PCR sequencing are also provided. All positive
specimens identified by local laboratories are requested to be forwarded for species iden-
tification, and subtyping is currently carried out as part of outbreak investigations by
sequencing part of the gp60 gene [10]. There is much variation in the gp60 gene amongst
C. parvum cases in the UK, but most C. hominis cases in the UK and northern Europe are
gp60 genotype IbA10G2 [11].
Transmission of Cryptosporidium is usually faecal–oral with person-to-person, animal-
to-person, foodborne or waterborne spread [2]. Outbreaks in England and Wales linked to
animal contact, environmental contact, and food have been caused by C. parvum and recre-
ational water outbreaks are predominantly C. hominis, with few drinking water outbreaks
reported in recent years [10]. In the period 2009 to 2017, 46% of the 178 Cryptosporidium
outbreaks involved recreational waters, mostly swimming pools [10]. Usual pool water dis-
infection processes such as chlorination are not effective in killing Cryptosporidium [12], and
filtration with flocculation is required to remove the oocysts [13]. Outbreak investigations
have utilised epidemiological, environmental, and microbiological evidence, including
Cryptosporidium speciation and subtyping to understand links between cases [10].
Between 26 September 2016 and 17 October 2016, 51 cases of cryptosporidiosis were
reported to the Public Health England (PHE) North East Centre in Newcastle. The EHOs’
routine questionnaires initially showed that four cases reported recently swimming at one
or both of two local swimming pool facilities (pools A and B) or were a household contact of
a user of these pools. Epidemiological, microbiological, and environmental investigations
regarding the four cases and the two pools were initiated, and a multi-agency outbreak
control team (OCT) was convened on 24 October 2016 to review the investigation, instigate
case finding, develop hypotheses regarding potential exposures, and implement control
measures.
This outbreak was included in the summary analysis presented previously [10], but
here, we describe the outbreak investigation and the impact and value of a combined
approach integrating epidemiology, diagnostic and reference microbiology, and environ-
mental investigations in defining the extent of the outbreak and the likely source and
transmission pathways.
2. Materials and Methods
Cryptosporidium notifications were received by the Public Health England (PHE) North
East Centre and information was forwarded to local environmental health officials. To
identify potential links between Cryptosporidium cases, completed case questionnaires
(Supplementary material Figure S1) were prospectively entered by the HPT into local and
national systems. Cases who described exposure to pool A or B were included in the
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investigation. Symptomatic household or close contacts identified during case interviews
were also asked about relevant exposures. Exposure information was reviewed in order to
identify additional shared risk factors or other plausible sources of infection. EHOs, local
hospitals, and primary care services in the area were notified of the situation to enhance
case finding, ensure that new cases were reported promptly, and reinforce advice to cases
about refraining from using swimming pools while ill and for two weeks after symptoms
cease [9].
The local diagnostic microbiology laboratories routinely tested all stools from di-
arrhoea patients for Cryptosporidium. Faecal specimens were also requested from any
symptomatic household contacts that were identified during case investigations or from in-
dividuals who contacted EHOs or PHE to report symptoms following using either pool. For
Cryptosporidium diagnosis, one local laboratory used an automated, plate format enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay, and the other used auramine phenol-stained microscopy [6].
Faecal specimens from locally diagnosed cryptosporidiosis cases were routinely forwarded
to the national Cryptosporidium Reference Unit (CRU) and were especially requested from
those who described exposure to pools A or B in the 1 to 12 days prior to developing
symptoms. The CRU characterized the Cryptosporidium species by real-time PCR based
on the Lib13 and A135 genes [14]; the PCR comprised two separate amplification assays
in the same tube enabling identification of co-infections with C. hominis and C. parvum.
Subtyping was undertaken by PCR amplification and sequence analysis of part of the
60 kDa glycoprotein (gp60) gene [15]. Cryptosporidium-negative stools from patients with
a high index of suspicion of cryptosporidiosis were also sent to the CRU for specialist,
sensitive testing by immunofluorescence microscopy (Crypto-Cel; TCS Biosciences, UK).
EHOs undertook environmental investigations at the facilities using an environmental
risk assessment tool. The tool is part of guidance for the investigation of cases linked
to swimming pools [16], is based on standards published by the Pool Water Treatment
Advisory Group [17], and includes parameters to assess whether the pool is being managed
accordingly as well as those pertinent to the control of Cryptosporidium. This involved
reviewing pool policies, management and operating procedures (required under industry
and Health and Safety Executive guidance as being essential to safe operation), pool water
treatment, routine microbiological sampling results, pre-swim hygiene practices, and pool
records. Relevant experts were consulted regarding chemical management. EHOs also
obtained advice from the PHE’s Food, Water and Environment (FWE) laboratory. Due
to the time elapsed since the exposure of cases, during which multiple turnover periods
and backwash cycles had occurred, and the implementation of early control measures,
it was thought unlikely that the results of any pool water sampling for Cryptosporidium
would further inform actions being taken. In accordance with national guidance about
such situations [16], pool water sampling for Cryptosporidium was not undertaken.
Microbiological and environmental findings of the investigation were summarized de-
scriptively. We described the epidemiology of the cases by time, place, and person (date of
onset of symptoms, dates/times of pool use, age and sex distribution, and cryptosporidium
microbiology) using the following case definitions:
Probable case: An individual who visited, or was a close contact of someone who
visited, pool A and/or B on or after 12 September, and who subsequently developed
diarrhoea within 1–12 days of attendance, for whom a reference laboratory confirmed
diagnosis was not obtained (excluding those who had a local laboratory negative result
unless epidemiologically linked to another confirmed case).
Confirmed case: As probable with reference laboratory confirmation of Cryptosporidium.
Probable and confirmed cases were further described as primary or secondary out-
break cases:
Primary outbreak case: An individual who visited pool A and/or B on, or after
12 September, and who subsequently developed diarrhoea within 1–12 days of attendance.
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Secondary outbreak case: An individual who developed diarrhoea in the two weeks
after contact with a primary case (household or equivalent contact), with no other exposure
thought more likely to account for their symptoms.
3. Results
3.1. Microbiological Investigation
Of the 22 diarrhoea cases, 14 submitted a faecal specimen of which 13 were confirmed
positive for Cryptosporidium by the CRU. Of these, one primary and one secondary case had
tested negative by auramine phenol microscopy at the local laboratory but were positive
by immunofluorescence microscopy at the reference laboratory. The specimen from one
symptomatic case who had contact with a confirmed primary case showed a positive
reaction in the enzyme immunoassay at the local laboratory but was not confirmed at the
reference laboratory so was classified as probable; there were nine probable cases.
Of the 13 confirmed Cryptosporidium faecal specimens, nine were C. hominis: four
primary and five secondary cases (Table 1). Four cases were C. parvum, all primary. Further
characterisation by sequencing of the gp60 gene was possible for eleven of the thirteen
confirmed cases (Table 1). All four C. parvum cases had different gp60 subtypes (Table 1).
Seven of the nine C. hominis cases were subtyped and were identified as IdA16. Three of
the IdA16 cases were primary, and four were secondary (Table 1).
Table 1. Outbreak-associated cases of confirmed and probable cryptosporidiosis, North East England,
2016 (n = 22).
Case Definition Species gp60Subtype Primary Secondary Total
Probable - - 3 6 9
Confirmed, species
only known
C. hominis Not known 1 1 2




C. hominis IdA16 3 4 7
C. parvum IIaA13G1R1 1 0 1
C. parvum IIaA13G1R2 1 0 1
C. parvum IIdA15G1 1 0 1
C. parvum IIdA19G1 1 0 1
Total 11 11 22
3.2. Descriptive Epidemiological Analysis
The investigation identified cases in nine households: 11 primary and 11 secondary
(Table 1; Figure 1). Primary cases’ onset dates ranged from 14 September to 31 October
2016 with pool use up to 21 October 2016. The median age for all cases was seven years
(range 1–65 years), and 59% of cases were aged ten years or under (Figure 2). Fifty-nine
percent were male (Figure 2).
All 22 cases reported diarrhoea, fourteen (64%) reported abdominal pain, ten (45%)
reported vomiting, and ten reported other symptoms including fever, nausea, lethargy, and
appetite loss. Two children were admitted to hospital. For the ten cases where symptom
duration was known, the median duration of symptoms was seven days (range 3 to
10 days). Two male cases, aged 8 and 10 years, described returning to swimming less than
two weeks after their reported end of symptoms (Figure 2).
No cases, or households with multiple cases, had multiple Cryptosporidium species
detected. The seven cases with C. hominis IdA16 (four male and three female) were from five
different households, in which other individuals with diarrhoea were identified, although
further testing of symptomatic household members was only undertaken in three of the
households, with a total of 11 secondary cases identified (Figure 2). The three primary
cases were aged 4, 6, and 8 years, and the secondary cases were aged 1, 37, 38, and 65 years
(Figure 2). Of the primary cases, one reported swimming at pool A, one reported swimming
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at pool B, and one reported swimming at both pools (Figure 2). The case who had only
swam at pool A and the four secondary cases all had contact with a probable or confirmed
primary case who had used pool B. Therefore, all IdA16 cases had either direct or indirect
exposure via a primary case to pool B (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Cryptosporidium outbreak timeline of laborat y results, dates of swimming, symptom
onset, and po l closures, for primary (1◦) and secondary (2◦) cases, North East of England, 2016
(n = 22).
All four C. parvum cases had different gp60 subtypes; two cases had used pool A only,
one had used both pools, and one had used only pool B (Figure 2).
In addition to pool use, ten cases reported contact with animals, which is also a
plausible Cryptosporidium exposure, especially for C. parvum. This contact was mostly
with companion animals (dogs, cats, rabbits, tortoise) and reported by C. hominis and C.
Water 2021, 13, 3152 6 of 12
parvum cases. One child in a family of four (all C. hominis, two known IdA16) also reported
visiting a petting farm within 14 days of onset of illness. Three cases from two different
households also reported having social contact, outside of the swimming pools, on one
occasion involving accidental faecal contact. There were no other reported exposures that
linked the cases or appeared more likely to explain their illness.
The outbreak was declared over on 1 December, four weeks after the pools re-opened
(on 1 November). The last primary case was referred on 14 November with onset on
31 October and had been swimming prior to the pool closures only. No further reports of
illness with exposure to either pool were identified.
3.3. Environmental Investigation
The setting was two public leisure facilities in North East England approximately
four kilometres apart. Both pools were owned by the same council and managed by the
same team, and the water came from the same two mains (municipal) supplies. Both were
monitored for Cryptosporidium, one continuously and the other weekly; there were no
detections from either works (Northumbrian Water Limited data). Although pool staff
had attended formal pool plant operator training courses, documented evidence was not
provided. Both facilities had a main and a learner pool each with separate treatment plants,
and they were multi-use facilities accessed by members of the general public for recreational
swimming, lessons, and clubs. Pool A was also used by groups using equipment that had
been used in open water e.g., sub-Aqua. EHOs first visited the pools on 18 October, and the
pools voluntarily closed as a precautionary measure on 21 October in order to undertake
control measures.
At both facilities, the pool surrounds were considered to be in a good and clean
condition, and the water was clear with no sediment at the bottom of the pools. Calcium
hypochlorite was the main disinfectant in use, and manual pH and combined/free chlorine
testing was undertaken four times a day. Supplementary UV light treatment was in place
for the main pools using slip stream treatment, which was provided by a medium pressure
UVC irradiation unit. Medium rate (<25 m/h) sealed sand and gravel filter vessels were in
use for both pools at both facilities. Filter backwashing procedures were documented and
reported to take place at least twice a week at night after closure. There was a lack of water
replacement as the backwash did not go to drain. Poly aluminium chloride was used as a
coagulant with continuous dosing. Routine microbiological sampling was undertaken on a
monthly basis using an accredited laboratory, and results for the most recent three months
(July, August, and September) were reported to be satisfactory. Hand-washing facilities
were unavailable at the nappy changing stations. No swim hygiene advice was on display
at either facility; although not a legal requirement, it is good practice [17].
Measured physical and chemical parameters were satisfactory or within range except
those mentioned here. In pool A, there was evidence of fluctuating free chlorine levels,
ranging from 0.39 to 2.2 mg/l, and combined chlorine levels were frequently greater than
half the free chlorine level. This indicated that the water treatment plant was either having
difficulty coping with bather pollution or that detergents in the pool water had combined
with chlorine. A coagulant dosing pump was indicating that a service was due but was
still dosing effectively. A faecal release had been reported to management with details of
how it was handled, but had not been recorded in the pool log book. The event occurred
more than a week before the onset of any cases; it was a formed stool that was assessed to
have been dealt with appropriately at the time, as per guidance [17,18], and considered to
be lower risk than a liquid stool. However, the lack of recording reduced confidence that
there were no other events. No other major operational issues were identified.
Pool B reported that high pH values of 7.6–7.8 were regularly recorded, which would
have reduced the effectiveness of the coagulant and thus filtration, and also of the chlorine
disinfection. A faecal release prior to the outbreak was reported during the pool inspection,
outside the incubation period of the first case, but no further details were available. The
paperwork for recording chemical checks did not indicate when action was required. There
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were occasions when backwashing may have occurred while the pool was in use. The
water from the showers on the pool side, which were used both pre-swim and post-swim,
ran into a deck-level drain.
3.4. Outbreak Control Measures
At both pools, further control measures were implemented on 21 October including a
backwash and subsequent replacement of one-third of the pool water, increased coagulant
dosing, replacement of 150 mm filter medium (as contaminants might penetrate to below
100 mm), and then circulating the water for 24 h, providing greater than six turnover periods
at correct disinfection and filtration parameters. This was to minimise any potential risk
should Cryptosporidium oocysts remain in the pool. The pools provided verbal updates
to visitors and improved signage regarding exclusion advice following diarrhoeal illness.
Staff training on pool water management focussed on managing chlorine and pH levels.
Staff deep cleaned the pool surrounds. The backwashing procedure was remedied so that
the backwash was discharged into the drain.
Other general hygiene measures included providing handwashing advice and the
additional provision of sanitising hand wipes at the nappy changing stations; although
these were of limited use for such purposes and not effective against Cryptosporidium, they
were a temporary measure as there were no sinks in the immediate vicinity of these stations.
Pool management issued letters to parents of children attending swimming lessons
and groups that used the pools informing them of the situation and highlighting swimming
exclusion advice. Both facilities introduced reimbursement or credit for any swimming
lessons missed due to diarrhoeal illness and advised swimmers not to swim for two weeks
following diarrhoeal illness.
3.5. Material Deposited
One C. hominis gp60 sequence, UKH96, representing the seven identical IdA16 sub-
types, was previously placed on Genbank with the accession number MK391442 when the
outbreak was included in a published summary of Cryptosporidium outbreaks [10]. The
four C. parvum sequences were placed on Genbank, accession numbers MZ596421 through
to MZ596424.
4. Discussion
This report describes a complex prolonged cryptosporidiosis outbreak of 22 confirmed
and probable cases that were most likely linked epidemiologically in time and place to
two swimming pools. Although Cryptosporidium is a notifiable agent in the UK, the full
extent of the outbreak may have been underestimated, as some symptomatic cases may not
have sought medical attention or were not tested. It is not known whether the probable
cases had cryptosporidiosis nor whether any asymptomatic contacts were infected. There
may have been recall bias towards cases reporting recreational water-related exposures,
once there was awareness of the outbreak, and under reporting of other exposures. As
some cases had multiple exposures to one or both of the pools and contact with other
cases prior to symptom onset, it was not always possible to identify whether a case was
primary or secondary or to calculate incubation periods. The epidemiology and timing of
symptom onset were used to assess this, although this may not have been correct and was
not possible to verify.
The outbreak coincided with the seasonal cryptosporidiosis increase [19], so a rapid
and consistent investigation of new cases was important in identifying common expo-
sures. Those carrying out surveillance should remain alert to identifying and investigating
common exposures, but this is not always done, and practice in England and Wales is
variable [8]. It is also important that other possible exposures are considered when cases
occur in a close geographical area, as swimming is a common activity. There was no
indication in the Cryptosporidium case surveillance data for the area supplied by the water
treatment works that cases might be linked to mains water consumption, and there had
Water 2021, 13, 3152 8 of 12
been no detections in the treated water. A child in one family reported visiting a petting
farm, but all cases were C. hominis, and it would be highly unusual to acquire C. hominis
from animals [10]. The distinctly different C. parvum subtypes indicated that despite being
epidemiologically linked, the cases were likely to be sporadic cases of incidental finding
without a single common source. This may reflect that swimming is a common exposure,
particularly amongst the affected age group. Although they were investigated in the same
way, none of the C. parvum cases were linked to secondary spread, which has been reported
to occur more frequently with C. hominis [19,20].
An analytical epidemiological study was considered but was not carried out due to
the statistical limitations of the small number of cases initially notified and because control
measures had already been implemented. However, investigators should consider carrying
out analytical studies in larger outbreaks in order to identify risk factors associated with
cases [21].
In line with usual public health practice, the case definition included those who devel-
oped diarrhoea within 1–12 days of attendance at either pool [2]. However, symptoms are
unlikely to develop before three days post exposure to C. hominis [4], and recommendations
for the public health management of gastrointestinal infections show that the usual range
is 3–12 days and the median range is five to seven days [9]. However, the first identified
confirmed case had an onset 2 days after using pool B, indicating either an unusually short
incubation period or mis-recall of their swim date. Including case definitions with a broad
time interval may be helpful in such circumstances and where cases of other pathogens
with shorter incubation periods might also occur.
The species identification and gp60 subtyping results added value to the interpretation
of the epidemiology by identifying cases that were likely to have a common source of
infection. Seven cases had a rare C. hominis subtype, IdA16, supporting the hypothesis
that they were likely to be associated with a single local source of exposure (one pool)
followed by wider household and community spread. The hypothesis was also supported
by existing knowledge; C. parvum is more commonly acquired from zoonotic transmission
than human, and outbreaks linked to swimming pools are more commonly caused by
C. hominis [10]. Prior to this outbreak, only three isolates of C. hominis IdA16 had been
identified by the CRU in different regions of England in 2008 and 2015, and no other cases
had been identified in the UK (verified by consultation with counterparts in Scotland; Claire
Alexander, personal communication). One of the UK cases was published previously [22].
Globally, other cases of C. hominis IdA16 were identified at the time from the Basic Local
Alignment Search Tool database and PubMed, from Australia [23,24], Bangladesh [25],
Egypt (GenBank), India [26], and Tasmania [27] and in wastewater samples in China [28].
More recently, cases have been reported in arctic Canada [29], Israel [30], and Sweden,
although these were linked to travel to China and Sri Lanka [31]. Nevertheless, IdA16
remains a rare subtype.
Speciation and gp60 subtyping results are not always available for all cases in an
outbreak, as samples may not be sent to the CRU or the gp60 PCR may not be positive.
This could pose an additional limitation to case finding if case definitions are too restrictive.
In this investigation, the application of specialist tests to two cases that tested negative
locally but where there was a high suspicion of cryptosporidiosis due to epidemiological
links to other confirmed cases was fruitful in providing a diagnosis and species but not
subtype. The diagnostic tests used for Cryptosporidium in the UK vary in sensitivity, and
comparison has shown the value of using specialist tests such as immunofluorescence
microscopy [32,33].
As not all cases were confirmed, it is not known whether cases in households were
infected with multiple species or genotypes. Given that some cases had multiple exposures
and background sporadic cases were also identified, this is possible. The PCR to identify
species would have a high likelihood of detecting if both C. hominis and C. parvum were
present in a specimen, but the Sanger sequencing technology for analysis of the gp60 gene
would be unlikely to pick up multiple infections unless additional analysis is undertaken.
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More recently, we were able to re-investigate the C. parvum sequences for previously
obscured mixed infections using the Tracking of Indels by DEcomposition (TIDE) algorithm
to analyse shifts in target sequences [34]. This post hoc analysis identified an additional
underlying Cryptosporidium sequence in the sample from case U and also probably case S.
This indicated the likelihood of multiplicity of infection in these cases, which is especially
relevant for case S, who swam on multiple occasions at both pools. The TIDE analysis was
unsuccessful for case V and identified only underlying sequence stutter in the sample from
case T. Improved reference chromatograms are needed for routine application of the TIDE
algorithm, and reference sequences are needed to extend its use to C. hominis subtypes.
In some households, the case with the earliest onset and with pool exposure was not
confirmed, but subsequent symptomatic cases were. This is expected, as public and health
professional awareness of a situation increases and subsequent cases may be more likely to
attend healthcare and submit a sample.
From a pool operator and management and from a public health perspective, control
measures at swimming pools need to be implemented quickly [18,21], and these are often
based on a hypothesized exposure rather than confirmed and before diagnosis. However,
the sooner diagnostic and reference laboratory results are available, the sooner the OCT can
be reassured that the control measures put in place are appropriate. Investigations should
apply a precautionary approach where there is a suggested, but not confirmed, pathway
of exposure. In this outbreak, individuals were known to be swimming while potentially
infectious, chemical values were out of range, there were reported and potentially unre-
ported faecal accidents, and multiple epidemiologically linked cases had been identified
with no other more likely exposure.
The fluctuating pH identified in pool B, which was often greater than the recom-
mended maximum value of 7.4 [17], would have played a contributory role in reducing the
effectiveness of coagulation, reducing filter efficiency for removing Cryptosporidium [17,35].
Although UV is effective at treating Cryptosporidium [36], this was not delivered full-stream,
contrary to recommendations [17]. The OCT hypothesized that an unidentified faecal event
or serial contamination may have occurred at pool B, which either overloaded the filtration
system or resulted in persistent environmental contamination. A lack of water replacement
subsequent to backwashing filters meant that one mechanism for diluting contaminants
was missing, and recycling backwash may have perpetuated the contamination. Results of
the routine microbiological monitoring showed that the chlorine disinfection was effective
but do not provide a good indicator for Cryptosporidium. The decision not to sample the
pool water for Cryptosporidium was based on the likelihood that oocysts would not be found
following multiple turnovers and backwash water cycles and some water replacement,
and that some intervention measures had already been initiated.
The evidence from this outbreak suggests that C. hominis IdA16 may be a relatively
infectious subtype with apparent higher transmissibility than C. parvum. Although both
species are transmissible, C. hominis cases have been reported to have higher excretion
levels [37] and are more often associated with family or household clusters [19]. When
cycle threshold values (which can estimate the number of oocysts present in a sample
and therefore indicate the magnitude of the infection) from the real-time PCR used to
identify C. hominis were compared, the outbreak IdA16 cases were similar to those of
contemporaneous background cases of C. hominis IbA10G2 cases predominant at the time
(CRU data, not shown) and are regarded as virulent [38]. There were insufficient local
C. parvum cases at the time for similar comparisons to be made.
Some swimmers reported returning to the pool less than two weeks after the end of
symptoms and may have returned to swimming while still infectious. Cryptosporidiosis
cases should be reminded not to use pools for 14 days after their symptoms resolve, as
per guidance on the prevention of person-to-person transmission [9]. It has been reported
previously that swimmers can be reluctant to adhere to the advice, and it seems difficult to
prevent cases returning [21]. The reimbursement and credits provided by the pool facilities
may help to mitigate this.
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5. Conclusions
Although this outbreak occurred in 2016, swimming pool-related outbreaks of cryp-
tosporidiosis continue to occur and can be complex as shown by the investigation described
here. While pool operating procedures should be sufficient to cope with low-level con-
tamination [39], failings may occur, and significant expertise is required to identify and
address these [40]. Pool management teams should ensure that operational guidance is
followed [17] and reinforce and maintain swim hygiene messages [16]. These are especially
important during peak use periods [39] and during outbreaks, as there will be return-
ing swimmers, and they may also use other pools. Messaging should also be reinforced
beyond the pool facilities, such as during healthcare consultations and via information
leaflets/posters. There should be a general availability of resources (posters/leaflets
etc.) for pools to use in order to advise users about exclusion periods; see for example
those provided by the Pool Water Treatment Advisory Group (PWTAG) available at
https://www.pwtag.org/posters/ (accessed on 4 November 2021). Public health profes-
sionals investigating cases of Cryptosporidium linked to swimming pools should refer to
local outbreak plans and the published guidance [16]. This includes the legal framework,
normal pool water treatment, operating parameters and standards, key indicators of good
pool management, establishing and investigating a link between cases and pools, emer-
gency actions for public health protection, public health messages, independent sources of
advice, and the inspection of swimming pools for which a checklist is provided [16]. Cryp-
tosporidiosis cases should be reminded not to use pools for 14 days after their symptoms
resolve, as per guidance on the prevention of person-to-person transmission [9].
The Cryptosporidium species identification and gp60 subtyping results added value
to the interpretation of the epidemiology by identifying cases that were likely to have a
common source of infection. This outbreak investigation demonstrated the added value of
using gp60 subtyping in helping to support the hypothesis, particularly as some cases had
multiple links and exposures. Subtyping distinguished between cases that were likely to
have a common exposure or were likely to be sporadic. The rarity of the C. hominis subtype
identified also supported the hypothesis that the C. hominis cases had been exposed, directly
or indirectly, to a single common local source.
While routine detailed epidemiological information should always be obtained in
outbreak investigations, this should be supplemented by characterization of the species
and subtype. This would add value to investigations by helping to support or refute the
hypothesis, particularly in swimming pool outbreaks where exposure histories can be
complex and multiple sources of infection are suspected. Awareness of the availability
and value of subtyping to laboratories should be raised so that more investigations benefit
from this service in the future and in order to further understanding of cryptosporidium
molecular epidemiology.
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